INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive and important debates in federal courts jurisprudence is over the role that history should play in interpreting Article III of the United States Constitution. To that end, federal courts jurisprudence is not altogether different from constitutional law jurisprudence more generally. But in the federal courts arena-more so than in the broader domain of constitutional law-originalism has always wielded tremendous influence over much of the judicial and scholarly thinking. 1 It is for this reason that a distinct conversation about its role in the federal courts canon is appropriate.
The panel giving rise to the following papers tackled this topic from different angles, and enriched the larger debate. First, on the panel (and elsewhere in their writing), Professors Bellia and Clark made the case for the importance of unearthing the historical backdrop against which the Constitution and early statutes were written as necessary to place the Founding © 2015 Amanda L. Tyler. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 For example, as Professor Fallon has written, "the originalist and textualist style of reasoning . . . has characterized nearly all leading academic writings on congressional control of jurisdiction." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (2010).
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period in its proper legal context. 2 Second, on the panel and in his paper here, Professor Fallon calls attention to the fact that the historical record that nearly everyone implicitly recognizes as pertinent (when not in the throes of a methodological debate) is exceptionally complex and multifaceted. 3 Professor Fallon's paper further proposes an interpretive framework for thinking about these issues that takes us beyond simply fixating on questions of original public meaning-which, he contends, is often indeterminate-and invites attention to a wealth of other historical and functional considerations. 4 Finally, Professor Grove's presentation and paper that follows highlight that many of the hardest questions of federal courts jurisprudence have been debated repeatedly in the legislative branch, and she poses important questions about what to do, if anything, with this political history of the federal courts. 5 There is little question that in the field of federal courts, historical study has a great deal to contribute to modern debates. Indeed, historical study holds enormous potential to illuminate the founding purpose behind constitutional provisions, to unearth contemporary meanings associated with terms of art that were included in the document, and to uncover important evidence relating to historical practices and context, which in turn can shed light on the background understandings and assumptions that underlie constitutional text. Indeed, much of my own scholarship has been work of this kind, aimed at uncovering the purpose, context, and background understandings that informed the adoption of the Suspension Clause. 6 2 Professors Bellia and Clark make a compelling case that such analysis is necessary to tell a comprehensive story of the Alien Tort Statute. But sometimes-if not often-the historical record on important questions of federal courts jurisprudence is absent, incomplete, or more complex than jurists and scholars tend to acknowledge. In keeping with this idea, one should never forget that certain aspects of the Constitution-including Article III and the structural framework within which it is situated-represented major innovations in their time. At the Founding, the concept of federalism-and with it the idea of two sets of courts, state and federal-was entirely new. Further, the separation of powers framework was, at the least, a transformation of the British model, if not a dramatic departure from it. 7 Against this backdrop, it would be curious indeed if the details of the Article III power were fully settled from the outset. More likely, as Madison recognized early on, there would need to be a "liquidat[ion]" of meaning over time, 8 or, as he phrased the matter some forty years after ratification: "That in a Constitution, so new, and so complicated, there should be occasional difficulties & differences in the practical expositions of it, can surprize no one." 9 Accordingly, I wish to offer a word of caution about making historical arguments in federal courts jurisprudence. Specifically, in undertaking historical inquiry in the field of federal courts, one must be careful about assigning certain data points from the Founding period determinative weight, rather than treating them as part of a larger conversation about the role of the judicial power in our constitutional framework. This is because in studying the early years following ratification of the Constitution, one tends to find both examples of major principles that remained the subject of disagreement as well as examples of early legislation and practices that today we cal evidence that informed the adoption of the Suspension Clause" and inquiring "whether the Founding generation's understanding of that clause permitted the government to detain without formal charges persons enjoying the full protection of domestic law for criminal or national security purposes in the absence of a valid suspension" (footnotes omitted)).
7 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (referring to separation of powers as "a distinctively American political doctrine"); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27-29, 36-56 (2001) (noting many structural differences between English and American legal traditions). Of course, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, first published in 1748 and which promoted the idea of separating power to protect individual liberty, heavily influenced the Founding generation.
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.").
9 Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908) ("It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily used in such a charter; more especially those which divide legislation between the General & local Governments; and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.").
would reject as plainly inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers. In support of this point, below I offer a few examples that together call into doubt the notion that the early Congresses had fully worked throughand correctly resolved-the many complicated issues affecting the scope of the federal judicial power. Although scholars have long recognized the limitations of reliance on history generally in constitutional interpretation, these examples are offered as a contribution to a key debate in the federal courts arena. In particular, by focusing on these contested and, in some cases, questionable actions of all three branches in the early years of the Republic, I hope to highlight some of the inherent problems with tackling questions regarding the delineations of the Article III power through an exclusively originalist approach.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF THE FOUNDING PERIOD ON FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE
It has long been a principle of constitutional law that special significance is assigned to the practices of and statutes enacted by the first Congress, legislating as it was in the shadow of the Constitutional Convention. As the Supreme Court posited in 1888, an act "passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning." 10 The Court has repeated this refrain on many occasions. 11 As some scholars have argued, moreover, early congressional debates provide "important evidence of what thoughtful and responsible public servants close to the adoption of the Constitution thought it meant." 12 This principle has taken on special meaning in the field of federal courts. Take Justice Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 13 defending the constitutionality of Supreme Court review of state court decisions. For Justice Story, it was significant that § 25 of the Act expressly contemplated such review (albeit only in cases in which asserted federal rights had been denied by the state courts) and that "the judiciary act was submitted to the deliberations of the first congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in framing, supporting, or opposing that constitution." 14 Drawing on this idea, a good deal of federal courts scholarship and jurisprudence focuses on the Founding period, and on the first Judiciary Act of 1789 in particular, as enormously important, if not determinative of many questions at the heart of the federal courts canon. To take but one example The courts were to receive evidence of the petitioners' military service, their war injuries, their resulting disabilities, and the proportion of their monthly pay corresponding to those disabilities. If the court found that a petitioner qualified for a pension, it was directed to submit the petitioner's name, as well as a recommended sum, to the Secretary of War. The statute directed the Secretary to place any applicant certified by a circuit court on the pension list, except that, in cases of suspected "imposition or mistake", the Secretary was to withhold the suspected petitioner's name and so report to Congress [which in turn reviewed the Secretary's recommendations]. 20 Attorney General Edmund Randolph, who had of course been a major player at the Constitutional Convention and the Virginia Ratifying Convention, filed a motion in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to run against the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania that would "command[ ] the said court to proceed" on the petition of William Hayburn, an applicant for listing on the pension roles. 21 resolved the matter, Congress amended the legislation, but not before five Justices made their views known while riding circuit that the statutory scheme violated the Constitution's separation of powers. 22 Looking back with the benefit of two hundred-plus years of hindsight, the assertions of Justices Wilson and Blair that the scheme was "radically inconsistent with the independence of th[e] judicial power" and of Justice Iredell that "no decision of any court of the United States can . . . be liable to a reversion, or even suspension, by the Legislature itself" seem to state the obvious. 23 And their reactions to the Invalid Pensions Act scheme make a modern case like Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., in which Congress attempted to command the reopening of final judgments, an easy one. 24 But the obviousness of the scheme's unconstitutionality was lost on the members of Congress who initially drafted and adopted the pensioner system, a substantial number of whom had also served in the preceding Congress that had recently passed the 1789 Judiciary Act.
B. The 1792 Calling Forth Act
The Second Congress passed another statutory scheme that today we would, at the very least, label as curious. In the 1792 Calling Forth Act, Congress set forth detailed standards and procedures governing when and how the President could "call forth" state militias to address invasions and insurrections. 25 The first section of the Act gave the President the power to call forth such militia "as he may judge necessary to repel [an] invasion" or "sufficient to suppress [an] insurrection." 26 The second section of the Act, however, required the President to seek certification from a judge before calling forth the militia in certain circumstances. Specifically, it provided:
That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, the same being notified to the President of the United States, by an associate justice or the district judge, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. 27 During the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, President George Washington invoked his authority under the Act to take measures for "calling forth" the militia in order "to suppress" the rebellion and he ordered the insurgents to 22 disperse at the risk of being arrested. 28 He did so, moreover, after following the procedures contemplated in section 2 of the Act and submitting the matter to Associate Justice James Wilson. President Washington reported in his proclamation, in which he invoked his authority to call up the militia, that he had presented the matter to Justice Wilson, who did, from evidence which had been laid before him, notify to me that in the counties of Washington and Alleghany, in Pennsylvania, laws of the United States are opposed and the execution thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshal of that District. 29 In other words, President Washington sent troops to put down the Whiskey Rebellion only after receiving certification from a Supreme Court Justice that the situation was dire enough to warrant such a dramatic response. The contemporary practices of courts leading up to this period may offer some explanation for why the Second Congress adopted, and President Washington worked within, this structure for responding to the violent insurrection at hand. 30 But it is fair to say that many modern jurists and commentators would label as odd, if not constitutionally suspect, a scheme that required the President to seek judicial certification before exercising his powers as commander in chief. 31 
C. The Correspondence of the Justices
Around the same time, President George Washington, who had served as President of the Constitutional Convention, also apparently believed that he could send abstract legal questions to the Supreme Court Justices in order to obtain their advice on how to navigate various legal constraints in the face of warring among the European powers. Specifically, in 1793, through his Sec- 31 On a separate note, the episode has the potential to contribute to debates over the capacity of courts to review questions going to the existence or nonexistence of wartime conditions. On this debate, see JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 55 (1993) (" [T] he Supreme Court has routinely decided 'foreign affairs' and 'national security' cases throughout the nation's history, and more specifically has from the outset decided numerous cases involving the 'war power,' [including] the question whether Congress had sufficiently authorized a military action the president was conducting." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 176 n. retary of State, Thomas Jefferson, Washington sought the advice of the Justices with respect to a list of twenty-nine multi-part questions. 32 The Justices politely declined to answer the questions on account of their "being judges of a court in the last resort . . . which afford[s] strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions." 33 Today we teach the episode as settling the canonical rule that the federal judicial power does not permit issuance of advisory opinions. But if Washington and Jefferson sent the questions over with genuine expectation of soliciting advice, 34 it would seem hard to make the argument that the principle was universally settled at the Founding. 35 As Professor Fallon observes in his paper, this example is one of several from this period suggesting that at least some aspects of the Article III power were still contested during the early years of the Republic. 36 In this regard, consider also the 1789 Judiciary Act's provision for circuit riding, which some at the time argued was unconstitutional, and the repeal of the midnight judgeships by the Jefferson Administration as one of its first acts, the constitutionality of which remains the subject of some dispute to this day. 37 
D. Federal Common Law Crimes
Federal common law crimes present a more complicated matter, but one that provides another example of certain assumptions about the federal judicial power being unsettled at the Founding. Congress gave exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over prosecutions for federal crimes in the 1789 Judiciary Act, 38 Where the statutory law ended, federal judges initially stepped in to declare and enforce federal common law crimes. This practice continued well through the first decade in the life of the federal courts, 41 with many lower courts concluding, in the words of one such court, that "[t]he federal courts have common-law jurisdiction of criminal cases, and may punish a crime though there be no express statute for that purpose." 42 By 1800, moreover, all but one of the Justices on the Supreme Court had approved of federal common law crimes while riding circuit. 43 The remaining Justice, Samuel Chase, launched the movement to reject federal common law crimes in 1798 in United States v. Worrall. 44 In his view, the courts had transgressed their carefully prescribed powers in declaring and enforcing such crimes. 45 But [t] he legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence." 48 In Coolidge, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this position and largely settled the matter, but only after reversing an opinion by Justice Story riding circuit that upheld enforcement of a common law crime in the process. 49 To be sure, Hudson & Goodwin may be under-stood in part as a product of the political atmosphere, 50 but it marked an important departure from an earlier well-accepted practice.
Today the Hudson & Goodwin position rejecting the idea of federal common law crimes essentially controls, but some subsequent authority does question its reasoning at its broadest. 51 The example reveals two lessons. First, the separation of powers concerns animating the Hudson & Goodwin Court were apparently lost on almost every member of the original Supreme Court and only came to be recognized several decades after the Founding. Second, notwithstanding Erie v. Tompkins, 52 the fact that some enclaves of "new federal common law" (Judge Friendly's term 53 ) have been recognized as appropriate might support lines of reasoning, like those the Supreme Court relied on in the case of In re Debs, questioning the wholesale rejection of federal common law crimes. 54 In other words, the separation of powers principle rejecting federal common law crimes took decades to establish and may even be, to some extent, contestable today. * * * Each of these examples suggests that not all of the principles of federal courts jurisprudence that we take for granted today were necessarily settled at the Founding. Take the Correspondence and Hayburn's Case. 55 Both represent matters on which there was serious disagreement among the branches over the judicial role, and yet the early members of the Supreme Court came rather quickly to conclude that what others had unthinkingly taken for granted harbored serious constitutional problems. These examples also suggest that even where there was widespread agreement among members of the Founding generation on a proposition (such as the propriety of common law crimes or the structure built into the original Calling Forth Act), today we might view their conclusions as constitutionally suspect. (This is certainly true with respect to federal common law crimes, at least as a precedential matter.) Together, these examples call into question the idea that early legislation and practices relating to the judicial power should be given determinative weight as an indicator of original meaning, rather than viewed as part of a larger unfolding story by which that power came to be defined in our constitutional framework. This inescapable conclusion counsels in favor of widening the lens of analysis to take account of arguments predicated upon text, structure, and purpose, 56 as well as unfolding historical practice 57 and precedent, 58 and perhaps normative considerations as well. 59 There is bound to be disagreement over the proper approach, but it is a conversation that federal courts scholars should be having. 60 
CONCLUSION
Historical inquiry can-and must-be a part of any debate over the meaning of Article III and the myriad related questions that arise in the field of federal courts. The hard question is what to do with that history, particularly when it fails to paint an entirely consistent picture, paints a picture we do not like, or fails to paint any picture at all. My aim here has been to suggest that some of the debates at the heart of the federal courts canon tend to forget an important truth about the period surrounding the adoption of the Constitution on this score. As historian Jack Rakove has observed, the Founding period documents are the product of collective decisionmaking "whose outcomes necessarily reflected a bewildering array of intentions and expectations, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements to disagree." 61 In other words, at least to some extent, we must treat the period as a work in progress.
